

TEXT OF ADDRESS

BY

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Well, I'm very delighted to have this opportunity to be here and talk with you tonight. I talk with some awe and with some misgivings. I see some very distinguished people in the audience. Just before dinner I was recalling to General Lemnitzer that some years ago as a young Lieutenant Colonel in the NATO Standing Group I was asked to go and brief a number of very senior retired generals - to welcome them. I went over there, and I thought I did all right. But then they began to nail me to the floor, asking me how does the Alliance go to war. Well, this is a rather difficult question to answer, so I danced around a little bit on that and left quite crestfallen, thinking I hadn't done very well. And I will never forget - and I still have it - I got a letter from the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, telling me I hadn't done as badly as I'd thought. So I hope he will be as indulgent with me this time as he was that time.

You mentioned that the Central Intelligence Agency is under the hottest attack. But I think there should be no mistake. We are just at this point taking the fire that was intended for everybody. When they say the Central Intelligence Agency shouldn't do it because it's the FBI's job, they don't really want the FBI to do it either. And really, I believe we are witnessing a massive attack on American intelligence, [an attempt to create a group who should be shunned by their fellow Americans, a whole pariah caste. I don't want to get too much into being very defensive about this.

But you've heard all about the assassinations. What was the final conclusion? Nobody was assassinated.

You've heard all about the toxins. What was the final conclusion? They were never given.

You all saw everybody brandishing the dart gun. The conclusion was they were never used.

Why did we get into those things? Because the Soviet Union was doing them.

People say why did you get into the drug testing program? Well, we saw a man like Cardinal Mindszenty who had resisted every kind of pressure in imprisonment by the Nazis. Then suddenly he appears before the movie cameras, hollow-eyed, to confess everything that his communist captors wanted him to confess. And we wondered how this was done. Those of us who are old enough to remember are convinced it was done with mindbending drugs. And if it was done that way, we had to know about it to be able to defend ourselves and, if need be, to retaliate.

And it wasn't just the Armed Forces or the CIA who were doing drug experimentation. Many distinguished American universities and the National Institute for Health were doing it at that time. But nobody saw anything morally wrong with that.

The trouble is people don't remember today the strength of our commitment after Pearl Harbor: never to be surprised again. They don't remember today the strength of our commitment to stop the menace of communist expansion. And anybody who attempts to judge the past by looking through the perceptions of the present is not only going to fail to read the past; he's not going to understand tomorrow.

And that is a very dangerous thing. We live in a different kind of world than has gone on in the past. President Madison once said that he hadn't heard from his minister in Spain in two years, and if he didn't hear from him pretty soon he was going to send somebody to see what was going on in Spain.

We live in a time of instant communications. We live in a time when the policy makers have to make decisions immediately, on the basis of the information that is pouring in and crashing around their ears while they're trying to reflect on what they have to do.

This is a totally different kind of world. It's a world of instant information. In the old days there was a reflective pause before you decided what you were going to do about things. When George Washington said, "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," he was talking about a United States that had a two months' cushion on either side of it. In the later period of our history, World Wars I and II, the world was not bi-polarized or tri-polarized. There were many other large powers between us and the aggressor. And we faced a different thing. Germany, even at its wildest, was never anything other than a European power.

The Soviet Union is a global power and is becoming more global every day. If we fight tomorrow, it will be the first time since Valley Forge we will fight someone who controls more resources than we do. The Soviet Union. And what the Soviet Union has today, China will have tomorrow.

I think this is one area in which we must be careful not to let ourselves be deceived. In my opinion, there is no doubt the Chinese are simply using us as the far barbarians against the near barbarians, who are the Soviet Union. If you look and see what the Chinese are telling their own people about their relationship with the United States, anybody who thinks they have any fraternal feeling for us, or any feeling of comradeship with us - is due for a sad disappointment. They passed a paper around among their cadres explaining why "they let Nixon come to China." And this is quite explicit. It was the using of the far barbarians against the near barbarians.

Today intelligence, because of this time factor gap, is more important than ever before. And the timeliness of intelligence is more important than ever before. Because if it isn't timely, it isn't intelligence. It's history. There is no use getting what was going on a month ago, or a week ago. You've got to have a continuous flow of timely information.

But where do we see this massive attack? We see it on the eyes and the ears of the United States.

If you take a giant, he is a fearsome person. But if you blindfold that giant, he may be as helpless as a child. In my opinion, one of the great things we have to do is just not stand still to have the blindfold put on our eyes. And an attempt is being made to put the blindfold on our eyes. An attempt is being made to criticize, to stifle, and to discredit - not just the CIA - all intelligence.

Today I saw that one of the Congressional Committees voted to

abolish a whole element of intelligence in the Defense Department.

This is based on the expertise of three months.

One must marvel at the expertise of these people. We had an investigator come out and see us, a young lady from one of the Congressional Committees who was their security officer. This was her first job in her whole life. And she was the security officer in one of the Congressional Committees investigating us. So one must marvel at the ability to pick these people with this prescience.

And one of the reasons that this is going on, in my view, is that intelligence is knowledge. And knowledge is power. And he who holds intelligence holds knowledge. And he who holds knowledge holds power.

And, again, if you can in some way damage the flow, interrupt the flow, discredit the flow of knowledge, you will bewilder your opponent.

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And we are witnessing this on an international scale, not just a national scale. It's occurring in other countries as well. Right now, the former chief of the Italian Intelligence Service is in jail. There have been these kind of assaults on various parts of the intelligence services of various of the Western countries, that bother these people.

And one thing that I think is very important is that good intelligence contributes to the deterrent. If they know that we know it, it will inhibit what they do. If they are certain that we are able to follow what they're doing, this will certainly have a deterrent effect on what they are going to do. The difficulty of

cheating, if it becomes clear to them that we know they're cheating, is it's going to inhibit them or cause them to spend more resources to be more skillful in hiding their cheating.

Good intelligence enables you to gauge how much is enough for your own defense budget, so that you aren't building up against an unknown quantity which would require you to make a maximum effort and perhaps turn us into a garrison state, which we couldn't do politically. But if you have good intelligence and you have some idea of the order of magnitude of what you may have to deal with, then you can in some way measure your response to it, without impoverishing yourself. After all, they have a much more tightly controlled society. They can impose sacrifices on their people that they can observe. If anybody gets out of line, you just shoot them. It's very simple. That's the way they handle these things. They can impose sacrifices on their people that we can't hope, in a democratic society, to impose. And I think this gives them the advantage of trying to spend us, if possible, into the poorhouse. Because the poorhouse to us, if it was the same as a poorhouse to them, would be an unbelievable situation to us. Their people have lived all their adult lives with famines and starvations and everything else. And they have an ability to absorb this sort of stuff which we do not.

Now as we look around, we hear the kind words of detente. But what do we see? We see almost a maximum effort on the part of the Soviet Union in every area that you can think of. We see the Soviets

deploy five new types of missiles, third generation missiles. And who knows, they may be glimmering of some more coming along the road. We see these missiles equipped with multiple warheads. We see the Soviets making the same kind of an effort in the field of their conventional forces. In their Navy. The Soviet Navy used to be within recent years a coastal navy. The Soviet Navy is now able to project its strength all over the world. The Soviet Navy is showing the flag all over the world. The Soviets are developing high performance aircraft of all sorts which they are not chary of giving out to their friends and allies. And Mr. Brezhnev has told us, and many of us will not listen. He has told us that he's all for detente. But he's told us that they see nothing incompatible between detente and their support of national wars of liberation. And he added, "Because with each victory of one of these wars of national liberation, our strength grows vis-a-vis the imperialist camp." That's about as plain a notice as you can get. He's not deceiving us.

I was saying during the dinner to one of my friends, "One of my Brazilian friends once said to me, 'You can trust the communists.' And when I looked shocked, he said, 'Yes, they really are.'"

And sometimes we get these interpretations that they're not really - that they're thinking of something else, and everything else. But if you think of the percentage - and this is a very difficult question which I'm not going to get involved in today - of the total cost of Soviet expenditures. There are so many standards by which you can organize this, and everything else. My personal conviction is that the Soviets are spending more money than we are out of a gross national

product less than half as big as ours. Now I'm not going to attempt to put this into dollars or costing or anything else. Because in the United States, when the United States builds a missile in Huntsville, Alabama, and puts it on the Florida railroad to send it to Cape Kennedy, the U.S. Government pays the railroad to boot.

In the Soviet Union, where the Soviet government controls all the means of production, distribution, and transportation, this is just going from one Soviet pocket to the other. Okay, some part of it comes out of the gross national effort, but it's very, very difficult - and this is a tremendously moot question within the intelligence community today - the exact measure. And I personally don't believe you can get any exact measure. I would say that in gross terms I think the Soviet Union is spending more money on defense than we are. And it's doing it out of a gross national product, as I say, less than half of ours. This is a reality of life, whether we like it or not.

Now, put this aside. Granted that this may not be their intentions, but the sacrifice imposed on them to build up this kind of a force is enormous. Now some people will say, "But they won't use it because that will set off a nuclear war." Well, I don't believe they may necessarily use it militarily. But whatever people tell you, my impression is that the perception of three is more than the perception of two. And frankly, I think what they're trying to play with us is a sort of chess game. You don't, like in checkers, jump the man and take him off the board. You create a situation, he looks at it, and he says "Check."

In my opinion, the Soviets have never forgotten the various times they've had to back down, on Berlin and other places, and the humiliation it brought them. And in my opinion, they have absolutely resolved that this is not going to happen to them again.

It reminds me of a wonderful story of Winston Churchill on the night of the 10th of May, 1941, when he stood on the roof of the Air Ministry in Kings Way in London and watched London burn. And someone said, "Prime Minister, what do you think of it?" He said, "It's a terrifying spectacle, because nobody will ever see it again."

In my opinion, the Soviets have said this about their past humiliations. They've looked at them, and they've said, "This is not going to happen to us again."

From the way they've been building up their forces, I'm not sure that it will happen to them again.

Now, how do we collect this intelligence? Well, an enormous amount of intelligence is collected overtly - through the press, through broadcasts, and through other things. I'm fond of saying that if you read the Minsk Pravda long enough, you can find out a great deal about what's happening in the Belorussian Republic, and consequently in the Soviet Republic. And if you have people doing this for a long time, they develop a sense. They can sense shifts. They can sense priorities. They can sense movements of various kinds.

And then, of course, we collect it technically. And I think this is one of the two great contributions America has made to intelligence, which I always claim is the oldest profession in the world, because

before the one that's claimed to be the oldest profession could operate, somebody had to know where it was. And that required intelligence.

So we collect it technically. And we adapted the genius that has made us the only people to walk the silent face of the moon to the technical collection of intelligence. And it is done in absolutely mindboggling ways.

But in a closed society like the Soviet Union, you can get in on a great many things with technical intelligence. But it's hard to get into the decision process. And it's hard to get under a roof. And for that you need people.

After all, if somebody would tell you what is going on somewhere, it could save you an extremely expensive technical system to find out what's going on there. And I think we have done well in marrying the two - in using the technical to vector the human sources into further collection on that particular subject. I think that we have been able through human sources sometimes to pinpoint things that we could then use our technical means to find out. And it is a happy marriage.

The James Bond facet of intelligence is enormously exaggerated. In fact, I always say we carry the cross of James Bond around our neck. Not that some of this isn't necessary. Some of it is necessary. But it provides a totally distorted view of intelligence. At the present time five to six percent of our budget is going into this type of intelligence as compared to other parts of intelligence. But, of course, this is the one that titillates the public fancy, and this is the one that gets all the attention from the media and so forth because it's

the most exciting. We need all of these means of collecting intelligence because the target is multiple. The target is worldwide. And the target is constantly changing.

But one of the big problems we have is back at the beginning - efforts to blind our intelligence. There is one subject to which I return constantly. And those of you who may have heard me before will probably be nauseated by it. And that is what I am fond of calling the new forms of war.

The new forms of war are basically founded upon a book written 25 centuries ago by a Chinese scholar called Sun-tzu. Now the book has been translated into English, but reading the book - it's in the form of the Chinese dialogue. And this is not easy because Chinese dialogues are sort of like this: "If I don't want you to go to Paris, I tell him not to go to London." But since we're all Chinese we understand there's an indirection. And the real message gets through. But if you're not Chinese, it requires a lot of interpretation. I always say that reading the translation of Sun-tzu is like swimming in a pool full of maple syrup. It's hard to do.

But Sun-tzu set it all out for us. Not long ago the German Service gave me a beautiful edition of Sun-tzu that was put out by the East German Service for the indoctrination of the East German forces in Berlin. And it says it all. It's all there.

He starts out with this general consideration. Fighting is the crudest form of making war that there is. Then he goes on to tell you how to undo your enemies. Number one: Cover with ridicule everything that is valid in your opponent's culture. Number two: Implicate their

leaders in criminal enterprises and at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Number three: Aggravate by every means at your disposal all of the existing differences in your opponent's country. Number four: Agitate the young against the old. And he goes on with others. He says, "Weaken the enemy's will to resist with sensuous music." You might say drugs.

All of this can be adapted and brought up to date. But then he brings you to this conclusion, "The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles. The supreme excellence is to subdue your enemy's armies without ever having to fight them."

They know that a nuclear war would be intolerable in various forms of it. In my opinion, they do not intend to have one. They intend, as Lenin said, "The capitalists would do business with us. They would even sell us the rope with which we're going to hang them."

And this is what they're working for. It has been proved by history that you cannot stop the United States from the outside. It has also, unfortunately, been proved by recent history that you can stop it from the inside.

And, in my opinion, this is a new form of war which we as a people do not yet understand. We do not understand the nature of the means by which this is exercised. I can't prove this to you. But I am absolutely certain that a large part of the so-called New Left is doing the Soviet Union's work without realizing that it's doing it.

Now, they're all saying, "Oh, we're against both super imperialist powers."

But let's see what they do. They denounce the Russians, and they denounce us. But they've kidnapped Americans. They've killed Americans. They've bombed American embassies. They've hijacked American aircraft. Have they ever done any of these things to the Soviet Union?

In my opinion, the Soviet Union pushes, nudges gently, the New Left in the right direction. As long as they're doing what the Soviet Union wants in a gentle way. And it's a much looser control. I don't believe it's a centralized control. I believe it is orchestrated. It says, "Violins up, wind down." And because they do not have direct controls over these things, it's extremely skillfully done. It is difficult to get the evidence. People always say, "Where's your evidence? Where's your evidence? Where's your evidence?" Well, your evidence is very hard to get. But if you apply the pragmatic principle, Qui Bono, who benefits from it. I would say that everything the New Left fights against benefits the Soviet Union.

Now, I can't tell you I know the name of the guy who tells the Socialist Workers Party, or something else, to do this, that, and the other. Nevertheless, in my belief, this is the way the thing is being orchestrated. This is the way it's being run. And they have a very ripe ground in America.

We have this deep puritan ethic in our national life. A French friend told me a great story. Some of you may have heard it again. And if so, I apologize.

He said, "On an island in the Pacific, the cannibals captured three guys. One was an American. One was a Frenchman. And one was

an Englishman.

"And the cannibal chief said to them, 'I have bad news and good news for you. The bad news is we're going to have you all for lunch tomorrow. The good news is I'll give you anything you want, short of setting you free in the meantime.'

"So he turned to the Frenchman, and he said, 'What do you want?'

"And the Frenchman said, 'Well, if I'm going to be executed in the morning, I think I'd just as soon spend my remaining hours with that beautiful cannibal girl over there.'

"So they said, 'Okay.' And they untied him. And he and the cannibal girl went off into the woods.

"Then they said to the Englishman, 'What do you want?'

"And the Englishman said, 'I want a pen and paper.'

"And they said, 'What do you want a pen and paper for?'

"He said, 'I want to write a letter to Secretary General Waldheim to protest against the unfair, unjust, and unsporting attitude you have adopted towards us.'

"'Okay,' They gave him a hut and a pen and a paper, and he started to write.

"Then they said to the American, 'What do you want?'

"The American said, 'I want to be led into the middle of the village and I want to be made to kneel down. And I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end.'

"And they said, 'It's a pretty odd request, but the Americans

are a pretty odd bunch. And I promise that we'll do it.'

"So they led the American into the middle of the village. They made him kneel down. The biggest cannibal took a flying leap, kicked, and knocked him fifteen feet. Now the American had been hiding a submachine gun under his clothes. So he took out the submachine gun, and he cut down the near right cannibal, and the rest fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the woods. The Englishman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the hut. And they looked at the American standing there with a smoking pistol in his hand, and they said, 'You mean to say you had that thing the whole time?'

"He said, 'Sure.'

"They said, 'Why the heck didn't you use it before now?'

"The American looked at them with an expression of deep sincerity, and he said, 'But you don't understand. It wasn't until he kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for such extreme action.'"

And they know this. And they use it. Right now, if you look at American history, we've always developed good intelligence during our wars, and we've always immediately wrecked it thereafter. As a young Second Lieutenant I was sent to the U.S. Army Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, in 1942. The Commandant of the U.S. Army's Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchey in 1942 was a British Colonel. That was the state of American intelligence at the outbreak of the war. The first ten training films I saw were all British.

Now the wreckers have taken a little longer because we've had the Korean War and the Vietnam War. But the wreckers are there at work now, trying to demolish this intelligence capability. They're trying to tell us that the Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked this.

Well, in this Bicentennial year, I've done some research on the Founding Fathers and found some interesting things, some of you may have heard of before. George Washington organized three separate kidnap attempts on Benedict Arnold. And I think we all know what he was going to do with him when he got him.

He also organized a kidnap attempt on Prince William of Britain, who was George III's fourth son, who later became King William IV, who was then a midshipman in the Royal Navy in New York. Matter of fact, there was a scuffle outside the Prince's house, and somebody got killed. George did send word, however, that he didn't want the Prince harmed. But he didn't send that word for Benedict Arnold.

George Washington wrote a letter to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey, Colonel Elias Dayton, in 1779, and this is what he said:

"The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I have nothing further to add on this subject. All that remains is for me to tell you that these matters must be kept as secret as possible. For lack of secrecy, these enterprises generally fail, no matter how promising the outlook or how well planned. I am, sir, your obedient servant, George Washington."

Then we have this thing now, you must tell everybody everything. Well, George Washington spent the night at a sympathizer's house. And

in the morning as he was leaving, he got up on his horse to ride off.

And the sympathizer's wife came out and said, "General, it was great to have you. Where are you riding tonight?"

And he leaned down in his saddle, and he said, "Madam, can you keep a secret?"

And she said, "Yes."

He said, "So can I. Good day."

And he rode off.

So, we have all this nonsense about how it is the American tradition to tell everybody everything, and so forth.

Well, you go to Benjamin Franklin. Benjamin Franklin was the Assistant Postmaster for North America from 1772 to 1775, when everybody was a loyal subject of George III. What was he doing as Assistant Postmaster of North America? He was reading that British mail like crazy. We were at peace. We weren't at war. So he got fired. But he went to Paris, and in Paris he had the French build him a printing press. And what did he print on the printing press? Well, he printed British currency, British passports, and fabricated atrocity stories, while fending off the approaches of Anthony Eden's great-great-grandfather, who was trying to subvert him for British intelligence.

As a matter of fact, curiously, in Florida the other day I had lunch with Mr. Eden, - Lord Avon as he is now - and I mentioned this. And he said, "Oh, you know that?"

It's a very interesting thing. His great-great-grandfather was working very hard on subverting Benjamin Franklin.

And yet the odd thing is that we have this lessened perception today of threat. And the threat is greater than at any time in American history. The United States has always been so far away that it was unreachable, and therefore unbeatable. That's no longer the case. And yet this is the time in which probably, since World War II, we have less perception of threat. And the potential enemy we face has greater forces than anybody we've seen since our independence. And yet we do not have any particular perception of danger.

Now everybody gives lip service to power second to none. But some of the people in Congress who mouth this all the time are the ones who are carrying the largest meat ax when it comes to striking at what is necessary to achieve power second to none.

One of the things that concerns me tremendously at the present time is the perception abroad of the United States. Now the greatest treasure almost in international life and policy that a nation has is its credibility. It wasn't until Britain and France had given Hitler the Rhineland, the Saar, Austria, the Sudetenland, and all of Czechoslovakia, and had totally lost their credibility that the Germans were prepared to take the gamble on Poland.

We have already given the Soviets four green lights. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and now Angola. And the perception that I call the Portuguese perception of the United States - if you travel abroad a great deal as I do - and we hide this from the American people - the American people still presume the United States to be the paramount military country in the world and to be recognized as so by all. Well, it

may be recognized by some, but this perception is shrinking rapidly. People are getting the impression that the United States is in such disarray that even though it may have impressive forces, they haven't got the will or the resolution to use them.

And they have things like you see going on now. We want to do something in Angola. Zap! It's voted out and prohibited.

Let me just read you what some of our best friends have said. And I'm not reading from newspapers that are hostile to us. I'm reading from newspapers that are friendly to us, like the London Daily Telegraph. This is what the London Daily Telegraph said. It's a long one. I'm only going to read you an extract. After describing what's going on in the United States, they say:

"Two morals are driven home by this woeful tale. One is for America herself. She must find effective means of keeping her secrets and of punishing those who for gain or notariety disclose and publish them.

"The other is for America's friends. They must look urgently to their own defense and security, for little help is for the time being to be expected from a country so sadly distracted and at war with itself in which no man can become eminent or important without being drowned in mud, ridicule, and calumny.

"And meanwhile, quietly and ruthlessly, without any such fuss or self-mutilation, Russia extends her grim sway."

Il Giornale, an Italian newspaper, very friendly to the United States, describing this same thing says:

"We see a spectacle in the United States where her intelligence officers are being published in lists, like bandits whom the sheriff is supposed to hunt down."

Let me give you another quote from the Daily Telegraph:

"America is accustomed to and has merited a good deal of deference from her allies. But deference can be a disservice. The United States should know that her European cousins and allies are appalled and disgusted by the present open disarray in her public life. The self criticism and self destructive tendencies are running mad, with no countervailing force in sight. She has no foreign policy anymore because Congress will not allow it. Her intelligence arm, the CIA, is being gutted and rendered inoperative. The names of the staff are being published so they can be murdered."

Now these are our friends. Now imagine the dubious people. Now the French always expressed a lot of doubts about whether we were really going to defend them. What frightens them now is that what they've been saying all along may be true.

And this is their concern. Because the day this perception of American impotence becomes generalized, a lot of our friends are going to start looking around to accommodation of one sort or another. And I think, as Secretary Schlesinger said so aptly the other day, "If we are not willing to defend anything but North America, soon we will have nothing but North America to defend."

And this will imply a militarized state as far as we're concerned

if we intend to survive in that kind of an atmosphere.

It is a disturbing panorama that we see everywhere around us. And yet, as I say, the problem is to attain some kind of perception for this immense potential that is arrayed against us. We have enormous questions to answer for which the American people are looking to us for an answer. In my opinion, we have four vital questions to answer. The first is, who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today, and what will be their dispositions towards us and towards our allies? Second, what is there in Soviet Research and Development today? This is a subject dear to my heart and my friend George Keegan. What is there in Soviet Science and Research today that will impact upon our lives?

In the past, you know for instance, the immense field of economic intelligence. Economic intelligence in the old days used to be a by-product of the study of military capabilities. Yet we live in a world in which billions of petrodollars and Eurodollars are drifting around the world and may be used in a hundred different ways that may impact on the life of a worker in Omaha. We need to know about them. In this time, we see what happens. Less than one penny out of every dollar spent by the United States government goes for intelligence. Intelligence has been on the downgrade in personnel and in expenditures and in manpower since 1969. Something like 40 percent. And this in a time of increasing threat. The threat to United States' survival is far greater today than it was in 1969. Yet we have 40 percent less people trying to find out the nature of that threat.

Not since Valley Forge has anybody had the ability to deal us not just a crippling, but even a mortal blow.

Those forces exist today. I'm not telling you that I know they're going to use them. But those forces do exist.

The two ocean cushion we had is gone. The time lapse that we've always had, the friendly powers behind whose defenses we were able to train and organize and prepare and get ready are no longer there. There's very little between us and the Soviet Union.

We have bolstered the Europeans during these times. To make an effort to convince them that the situation is not hopeless. If they see this lack of resolution among us, and they see this lack of a perception of threat among us, how long can they be expected to make what would seem to them puny efforts against the mighty Soviet Union?

There is the economic threat. We have seen what this can do in the oil boycott. The oil boycott is not the only area in which this can be operated. We could see it again.

As I said at the beginning, intelligence is knowledge. And knowledge is power. This is an area in which we need power to a degree that we have not needed it before. Time and space made that knowledge less important than it is today.

The attack on intelligence continues. In the last couple of days, it has sort of received a renewed breath. And yet if you take the record of - and I don't want to be overly defensive - 76,000 people have passed through the CIA in the last 27 years. If you took any community of 76,000 people and subjected it to the kind of scrutiny

that we have been subjected to, I would submit that we would come out not badly.

We find opposition to all forms of keeping our secrets, although we seem to see a little change in the tide.

We're not asking for anything really exceptional. All we'd like is to be on the same footing as the Bureau of the Census, or the Department of Agriculture, or the Internal Revenue Service. If you publish certain data from the Bureau of the Census or the Internal Revenue Service, you'll go to jail. If you publish in advance a crop forecast for the Department of Agriculture, you'll go to jail. We're not asking for any really special privilege. We are asking simply to give us some weapons to defend the eyes and ears of the United States.

I always say that the real issue before the American people is not the imagined or real transgressions - and I can't tell you we haven't had some kooks, that we haven't had some zealots, that we haven't had some people who've exercised poor judgment. You couldn't have 76,000 different people without such a thing. But again, I say people tend to forget the strength of the commitment under which these people were operating. As a matter of fact, the last CIA investigation we had was the Doolittle Commission. And the Doolittle Commission came up to the conclusion that the United States was facing a ruthless enemy determined to use every means in its power to destroy us and that we must match their dedication with ours and their ruthlessness with ours.

And here we are in hindsight attempting to judge things that were done 25 years ago against the morality of today.

Well, we had a group of young Congressmen out to the Agency, and the subject of assassination came up. And someone said, "Well, you know, this is a question of the perception of time. If anybody could have killed Adolf Hitler in '43 or '44, he would have probably been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross."

One of these young Congressmen said, "Yes, but if you could have gotten him in '35 or '36, think how many lives you would have saved."

And I said, "Congressman, we were at peace with Germany in '35 and '36. Do I understand you're advocating assassination in peacetime?"

He said, "Oh, no. That was different."

Well, what was different about it? The only thing that was different is we know what the result was. All this agitation about Castro. Those who were in my generation remember that every day on the television visible in Florida, Castro was shooting people in the National Stadium in Havana. And I mean to be perfectly realistic, the United States Government authorized the Bay of Pigs expedition. Now we surely expected some people to get killed in that. It was therefore the policy of the United States Government not to shrink from this kind of action against Castro. As a matter of fact, we didn't carry it through, and we see the result today. There are

10,000 Cubans in Angola. They're going to win. They're going to come home filled with victory. They're going to start looking around. Who's going to be next? Oil-rich Venezuela? The coming oil-rich Mexico? Nothing succeeds like success; Churchill once said that you cannot slake the appetite of dictators by feeding them small countries to eat. Their appetite grows while they eat. And from success to success their appetite will grow. The German Armed Forces had great misgivings about the operation in Norway. They had great misgivings about the attack of the West. But Hitler was right each time. Then when he told them to do the other operations, the experience had been that the Führer had been right against everybody's advice. And he could point to each success that he'd had in the past as a sign for more boldness in the future.

As I say, in my opinion the Soviets have already had four green lights. I just wonder where the next is going to be. And what will happen is that slice by slice the salami of U.S. credibility will be eroded. And as I said earlier, the greatest factor to keeping peace is the credibility of a nation. And we have got to find some way to bring home to our people just what we are faced with. We've got to try to find some way to bring about a consensus of what we must do about it.

And I trust the American people. We don't move like other countries in great majestic curves. I was recalling at dinner, that I was a Corporal in the U.S. Army in the Summer of 1941 when France had fallen. All Western Europe was occupied. And the German advance towards Moscow was continuing at 30 miles a day. And the United States

Congress approved the extension of military service by a majority of one vote. You think that didn't embolden Germany and Japan?

These are the problems we face. However, I am not a pessimist in spite of all I have told you. I am not a pessimist because if you look at the whole long history of mankind - at the 6,000 years of which we have record, we find that many tyrants in the course of those 6,000 years have been temporarily able to stem the flow of human history towards greater freedom and dignity for the individual. And if we look at history, we find that no tyrant has been able to do that permanently.

And I doubt very much whether modern communism, which is after all nothing but a medieval tyranny with new clothes, will be able to do that either.

The task is how we do it, and how we go about it.

I don't say America is sleeping. But it's dozing. Upon all of us who are in intelligence today is incumbent the task of trying to bring home these unpleasant realities.

We don't quite live in the ancient days when the bearer of bad tidings got his tongue cut out or was executed. But the treatment we see here meted out to the intelligence community today is not terribly unlike this. People don't like intelligence. They don't like intelligence giving them the facts.

Perhaps the greatest threat in America. This is the first time since the Revolution that we are really faced with a global power. That is a power that is growing all over the place.

In our schools, students are taught various things. The Soviet students today are learning what they learned twenty years ago.

Theirs is a mission, and theirs is the fatherland of socialism.

We live in a time when we are having these inquiries, and the Soviet Union is issuing a special stamp to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the KGB.

We've got to find our resolution. We've got to find our decision. We've got to reassure our friends that they are on the winning side.

Their society has some difficulties in it, too. But they have a sense of purpose. And if I were asked, what is the greatest problem in America today - it is a weakness in an area in which we have been traditionally strong. What made America great was our ability to work together for a common purpose.

We've got to find that ability again because everything that makes life worth living is at stake.